Article by Constance Monnier Schlumberger, published in November 2018 in the journal Concurrences.
 

This paper proposes an experimental approach to the effectiveness of anti-cartel schemes, which result from individual decisions to engage in these anticompetitive cartel practices.

Our experiences compare individual propensities to form cartels in monetary sanctions, leniency, compliance and exclusion schemes. The study thus assesses the impact of penalty modalities, their levels and different probabilities of detection, and identifies the influence of certain individual characteristics, such as gender and risk aversion, on cartel formation.

Our results show that exclusion and, to a lesser extent, compliance are the most effective deterrents to cartel formation. The level and the probabilities of sanction have the expected effects but in non-linear ways. Clemency strengthens the effectiveness of fines.

Finally, gender and risk aversion influence the propensity to choose to engage in a cartel, but not their rate of training. The implications of these findings for the regulator and companies are substantial: they provide an understanding of how to better deter these illicit practices.
 

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Contact the author : csm@oca-audit.com